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The Effect of Earnings Quality and Country-level Institutions on the Value 
Relevance of Earnings 
 
Steven F. Cahan, David Emanuel, and Jerry Sun. 2009.  Review of Quantitative 
Finance and Accounting, 33(4), 371-391.  Post-print 
 
1 Introduction 
 
A large body of prior research documents that the association between stock returns and 
accounting earnings (i.e., value relevance of earnings) differs across countries.1  Those 
studies imply two explanations for international differences in the returns-earnings 
association.  The first implication is that earnings quality (i.e., the quality of earnings in 
reflecting information about future benefits) varies across countries, thus resulting in 
differences in the value relevance of earnings.  The second is that the ability of stock 
prices to impound information also differs internationally.  Accounting earnings are a 
subset of this information, and hence the ability of stock prices to impound accounting 
earnings may also differ internationally, even when we control for the quality of earnings.  
Consistent with the first argument, Leuz et al. (2003) and Wysocki (2005) find 
that earnings quality is higher in countries with higher investor rights’ protection, 
suggesting that the returns-earnings association should be higher in those countries as 
well.  However, the second issue has not been widely addressed in the accounting 
literature, but this issue is salient as accounting researchers generally assume that stock 
prices are equally informative across countries when they investigate the returns-earnings 
association on an international basis (e.g., Bushman and Piotroski 2006).  Recently, a  
short-window study by DeFond et al. (2007) documents that the information content of 
                                                 
1
  See, e.g., Alford et al. (1993); Ali and Hwang (2000); Ball et al. (2000); Hung (2001); Fan and 
Wong (2002); Land and Lang (2002); Ball et al. (2003); Bushman and Piotroski (2006). 
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earnings announcements is greater in countries with higher earnings quality and stronger 
investor protection.  Our study complements theirs by measuring earnings quality at the 
firm level (they use a country-level measure of earnings quality), having a different 
orientation to issues of investor protection (property rights protection, rather than insider 
trading prohibitions), and providing evidence that the price formation process is affected 
by investor protection where earnings quality is controlled for.  That is, we are interested 
in the interaction between earnings quality and investor protection, where the returns-
earnings association is the dependent variable.   
Several recent finance studies show that market-wide variability in returns 
explains different proportions of firm-wide total variability, and this variability seems to 
be related to country-wide institutional features associated with investor protection 
(Morck et al. 2000; Bris et al. 2003; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2005).  Using this research as 
a basis, this study examines whether accounting information is impounded into stock 
prices differently across countries.  
          Classical valuation theory shows that stock price equals the present value of 
expected future cash flows (Miller and Modigliani 1961).  Consistent with the theory, 
Kormendi and Lipe (1987) document that the returns-earnings association depends on 
earnings persistence, which in turn measures the extent to which current earnings are 
related to future earnings.  Their findings suggest that the returns-earnings association is 
associated with the quality of earnings, i.e., the ability of earnings to reflect information 
about future benefits accruing to shareholders.  In this paper, we use two traditional 
earnings quality measures: earnings persistence and the relationship between earnings and 
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future cash flows from operations (hereafter described as the earnings-future cash flows 
relation, Wysocki (2005)).  
On the other hand, the returns-earnings association also depends on how stock 
prices reflect future cash flows.  If stock prices poorly incorporate the information about 
future benefits, the returns-earnings association would be weaker even if earnings reflect 
future benefits.  Thus, the returns-earnings association is related not only to the quality of 
earnings but also to the quality of stock prices, i.e., the ability of stock prices to 
incorporate the information about future benefits.  Where stock prices are able to reflect 
future benefits, the relation between the returns-earnings association and earnings quality 
would be more positive.  Hence, the strength of the relation between the returns-earnings 
association and earnings quality depends on the ability of prices to reflect that quality, and 
this in turn depends on the level of protection given to investors to trade on that (earnings) 
information.  That is, different countries may reflect the same levels of earnings quality 
but they will not necessarily reflect similar value relevance metrics if investor protection 
differs across those countries.   
Building on recent international finance studies, we contend that stock prices’ 
ability to impound accounting information is related to a country’s institutional 
infrastructure.  In particular, we are interested in the protection of investor rights and the 
nature of the information environment.  Using time-series data for firms in 13 countries 
from Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial file over the period 1993-2003, we find 
that the returns-earnings association is more positively associated with earnings quality 
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for countries with high anti-director rights2 or strong legal enforcement than for countries 
with low anti-director rights or weak legal enforcement.  Likewise, we find that the 
returns-earnings association is more positively associated with our measures of earnings 
quality when a country’s financial disclosure system is timely or when more analysts 
follow a stock in that country.  Our findings suggest that higher earnings quality 
information has a stronger association with value relevance when investor protection is 
higher and where information opaqueness is lower.  Within-country analyses corroborate 
our cross-country results.  We also document that the association between stock returns 
and earnings quality is higher in the United States than in other countries.  Overall, our 
findings are consistent with the notion that the returns-earnings association reflects not 
only the quality of earnings but also the quality of stock prices. 
         This study contributes to the literature in the following ways.  First, our study 
extends a line of research on the value relevance of earnings across countries.  
Prior research implies two explanations for the international difference in the returns-
earnings association: (1) that earnings quality is different across countries, and (2) that the 
ability of stock prices to impound accounting information is different across countries.  
The findings of several studies are consistent with the first explanation (e.g., Leuz et al. 
2003; Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Wysocki 2005; DeFond et al. 2007).  However, we 
provide evidence on the second issue and investigate whether stock prices impound 
earnings differently across countries even if the quality of earnings is controlled for.  
Furthermore, unlike recent studies (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003; DeFond et al. 2007), we 
                                                 
2
  We use the shareholder protection index from La Porta et al. (1998). 
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measure earnings quality at the firm level rather than the country level.  In these ways, 
our study complements the existing international earnings quality literature.  Our results 
have implications for international harmonization.  They illustrate that adopting common 
accounting standards (which may lead to similar measures of earnings quality) will not be 
adequate to ensure that the same information is represented in share prices.  
         Second, the study adds to a growing literature on international differences in the 
information content of stock prices.  Prior research finds that stock prices impound firm-
specific information differently across countries because of differences in investor rights 
protection, the openness of capital markets, and information environment opaqueness 
(e.g., Morck et al. 2000; Li et al. 2004; Jin and Myers 2006).  These studies do not 
examine whether stock prices impound accounting information (like earnings) in the same 
way in different countries.  Chan and Hameed (2006) do examine this issue, but in the 
context of emerging markets and analysts’ earnings forecasts.  Their study focuses on the 
role of analysts in emerging markets, and it includes an analysis of the impact of earnings 
forecasts on returns on portfolios, with the portfolios conditioned on whether analyst 
following is high or low.  In contrast to prior research, we use the association between the 
returns-earnings association metric and earnings quality to measure how well stock prices 
can capitalize the fundamentals reflected in earnings.  We provide evidence on how the 
returns-earnings association can vary with country-level institutional factors.  In our 
approach, we acknowledge the primacy of investor protection, which can affect both the 
quality of earnings and the quality of prices through its impact on how and whether 
informed traders trade.  
 6 
           Third, this study also adds to the stream of international accounting studies in 
terms of methodology.  Prior research usually conducts cross-sectional or country-level 
analyses ignoring the issue of innate factors (Francis et al. 2005).  Innate factors are 
particularly important in an international context because the make-up of firms within a 
national economy is likely to differ widely between countries. If these fundamental 
differences are not controlled for, omitted variables are likely to be a serious issue.  We 
control for five innate factors identified by Francis et al. (2005) in conducting our firm-
level tests across countries. 
           The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews prior research.  
Section 3 develops the hypotheses.  We describe the sample and research design in 
Section 4.  Empirical results are presented in Section 5.  Section 6 conducts additional 
analysis.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2  Literature Review 
2.1  Value relevance of earnings across countries 
Alford et al. (1993) find that the information content of earnings is different across 
seventeen countries.  Earnings are more informative in Australia, France, the Netherlands, 
and the UK than in the US, whereas Denmark, Germany, Italy, Singapore, and Sweden 
have less informative earnings than the US.  However, the results for the other eight 
countries are inconclusive.3  They argue that the difference in value relevance of earnings 
is due to the capital market differences including the financial reporting requirements, 
                                                 
3
  The other eight countries are Belgium, Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, Norway, South Africa, 
and Switzerland.  
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disclosure practices, government regulation, and corporate governance.  Ali and Huang 
(2000) investigate the relation between country-specific factors and value relevance.  
They find that value relevance is lower for countries with bank-oriented financial systems 
because of lower demand for value-relevant financial reports, and is lower in countries 
where private-sector bodies are not involved in the standard setting process because the 
intentions of government standard setters are likely to be politically motivated.  They also 
find that value relevance is lower for continental model countries, for countries where tax 
rules significantly influence financial accounting measurements, and for countries where 
less is spent on external auditing services.  
           Ball et al. (2000) find that earnings are more timely in common law countries than 
in code law countries.  Their findings are consistent with the notion that common law 
countries have a higher demand for timely public disclosure to mitigate information 
asymmetry that is more severe in common law countries.  Hung (2001) finds that the 
value relevance of earnings is higher for countries with accounting systems that use 
accruals more extensively and countries with strong protection of investor rights, 
suggesting that strong investor rights protection can enhance the benefits of accrual 
accounting by constraining opportunism.  
Fan and Wong (2002) document that the value relevance of earnings is negatively 
associated with ownership concentration in seven East Asian countries.4  They provide 
two complementary explanations for their findings.  First, the entrenchment effect of 
ownership concentration reduces the credibility of reported earnings and consequently 
                                                 
4
  The seven countries are Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand. 
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reduces their information content.  Second, high ownership concentration also hinders 
information flows to the public resulting in low earnings informativeness.  Ball et al. 
(2003) find that the four East Asian common law countries – Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand – have less timely earnings than other common law countries 
suggesting that poor incentives of managers and auditors reduce the quality of earnings 
even though the four countries have (so-called) high quality accounting standards.  
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) find that accounting conservatism across countries is 
affected by legal and political institutions.  
           DeFond et al. (2007) adopt a short-window approach, and examine the reaction of 
share prices (measured by a scaled squared residual) of firms across different countries, 
where the primary experimental variables are country-level measures of earnings quality 
and investor protection.  They find that earnings announcements are more informative 
when countries have higher earnings quality and stronger investor protection.  The 
investor protection metric uses insider trading provisions, arguing that strong provisions 
will lead to an increased earnings announcement effect. 
          In summary, prior studies find that the value relevance of earnings is different 
across countries.  Those studies imply two explanations for the international differences 
in value relevance.  First, the lower value relevance of earnings may be related to the 
lower quality of earnings in some countries.  Second, the lower value relevance of 
earnings may be related to the lower ability of stock prices to impound accounting 
information in some countries even if the accounting quality is high.  Findings in several 
studies are consistent with the first explanation.  For example, Leuz et al. (2003) and 
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Wysocki (2005) find that earnings quality is lower in countries with lower investor rights 
protection, where earnings value relevance could be lower.  Bhattacharya et al. (2003) 
find that earnings opacity is associated with two characteristics of a country’s equity 
market – the return that the shareholders demand and how much they trade – implying 
that earnings quality could affect the value relevance of earnings.   
In contrast to those studies, our study attempts to provide more explicit evidence 
on the second explanation, i.e., we examine whether the value relevance of earnings is 
associated with the ability of stock prices to impound (accounting) information across 
countries.  This study complements DeFond et al. (2007) in the following ways.  First, we 
use firm-level earnings quality metrics whereas DeFond et al. (2007) use a country-level 
measure of earnings quality.  Second, we provide long-window evidence in contrast to 
their use of short (two-day) windows.  Third, conceptually, our tests have a different 
orientation than theirs.  DeFond et al. (2007) argue that weak insider trading legislation 
will lead to a smaller share price reaction around the earnings announcement as it is more 
likely that the information will have been the basis for trades before the information is 
released.  Our orientation is that in weak investor protection environments, it is less likely 
that the information will be the basis for trading as investors’ property rights are less well 
protected.   
 
2.2 Information content of stock prices across countries 
Morck et al. (2000) find that stock prices in low-income countries impound firm-specific 
fundamentals less fully than in high-income countries.  Furthermore, they document 
evidence that stock price synchronicity is negatively associated with the protection of 
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investor rights.5  They conclude that higher protection of investor rights in developed 
economies promotes informed trading, resulting in more informative stock prices.  Where 
property rights are weak, informed trading is less and this reduces the probability that 
firm-specific information, including accounting information, will be impounded into 
share prices.  Wurgler (2000) suggests that lower stock price synchronicity in large 
capital markets could be due to more effective arbitrage facilitated by liquidity and low 
transaction costs.  Bris et al. (2003) find that stock prices incorporate information faster in 
countries where short sales are allowed and practiced.  Li et al. (2004) document evidence 
that firm-specific information is impounded more fully into stock prices in emerging 
markets with higher capital market openness than in emerging markets with lower capital 
market openness.6  Furthermore, the negative association between stock price 
synchronicity and capital market openness is magnified by country-level institutions.  
They find that firm-specific stock return variation is significantly related to the interaction 
term of capital market openness and a good government index.  
            Jin and Myers (2006) develop a theoretical model to explain why stock prices 
impound firm-specific information less fully in countries with less developed financial 
systems and poorer corporate governance.  They show that information opaqueness (i.e., 
lack of transparency) reduces the amount of firm-specific risk absorbed by outside 
                                                 
5
  They use the R-square from the market model as a measure of stock price synchronicity, and use 
alternative proxies for the protection of investor rights: (1) a good government index based on the sum of 
three country indexes: (i) corruption index, (ii) risk of expropriation index, (iii) repudiation of contracts by 
government index; (2) rule of law index; (3) judicial efficiency index; and (4) the origin of legal systems, all 
from La Porta et al. (1998). 
6
  They use the capital market openness measure provided by Edison and Warnock (2002). 
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investors, resulting in higher stock price synchronicity.7  Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2005) 
extend that literature by developing an alternative measure of firm-specific information 
based on the percentage of zero return weeks.  They find that their zero-return metric is 
better than the R-square from asset pricing regressions as a measure of the firm-specific 
information impounded in stock prices internationally.  Chan and Hameed (2006) 
examine stock price synchronicity and analyst coverage in 25 emerging markets.  They 
find that securities that are covered by more analysts have higher synchronicity, 
suggesting that the role of analysts is to determine how a company covaries with the 
market, rather than what is “special” about that company.  Their countries would 
generally be classified as those where investor protection is low.  
Overall, prior research finds that stock prices are more informative in countries 
with higher protection of investor rights, higher openness of capital markets, and less 
opaque information environments.  However, those studies do not explore how stock 
prices impound accounting information across countries.  Our study attempts to 
complement this line of research by incorporating earnings quality.  
 
3 Hypothesis Development 
3.1  Investor rights protection 
When countries have lower protection of investor rights, governments and politicians can 
make use of various tactics such as changing legislation, licensing requirements, 
                                                 
7
  They use five opaqueness measures: (1) a survey-based measure from the Global Competitiveness 
Report, (2) a measure of auditing activity from Bhattacharya et al. (2003), (3) a measure of how many key 
accounting variables are included in financial statements from La Porta et al. (1998), (4) an opaqueness 
measure from PricewaterhouseCoopers, and (5) an opaqueness measure based on the diversity of analysts’ 
forecasts.  
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repudiation of commitments, and nationalization to divert wealth to an entrenched elite 
(Morck et al. 2000).  In such countries, political events or rumors could lead to larger 
market-wide stock price swings, resulting in higher stock price synchronicity.  Lower 
protection of investor rights discourages informed risk arbitrage because government 
interventions and political uncertainty may reduce the benefits of seeking fundamental 
information and trading on that.  Finance theory shows that informed trading increases in 
the attractiveness of risk arbitrage (e.g., Grossman 1976; Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  In 
other words, firm-specific information is less useful to arbitrageurs if protection of 
investor rights is poor, and that decreases the number of informed traders relative to noise 
traders.  
          Morck et al. (2000) find that stock prices impound less firm-specific information in 
countries with lower protection of investor rights.  In those countries, stock prices may 
not fully impound information about future benefits of the firm.  If stock prices do 
impound information about a firm’s fundamentals, the association of stock prices with 
earnings would be positively related to the quality of earnings because high quality 
earnings better reflect the firm’s future benefits.  Thus, the association between the 
returns-earnings association and earnings quality gauges the ability of stock prices to 
capture the information about future benefits as reflected in accounting earnings.  For 
countries with lower investor rights protection, stock prices may have less ability to 
impound accounting information even if the quality of that information is high.  Hence, 
the association between the returns-earnings association and earnings quality would be 
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less positive when countries have low investor rights protection.  We develop the first 
hypothesis as follows: 
H1  The returns-earnings association is more positively associated with earnings 
quality as investor rights across countries increases. 
 
 
3.2 Information environment opaqueness  
Jin and Myers (2006) theoretically show that less developed financial systems and poorer 
corporate governance reduce the amount of firm-specific risk absorbed by outside 
investors, resulting in higher stock price synchronicity.  They document evidence that 
stock prices impound less firm-specific information in countries with high information 
opaqueness.  The more opaque the information environment, the greater the amount of 
bad news that insiders hide.  The credibility of all information, including accounting 
information, is lower in an information environment that lacks transparency.  If the 
information environment is highly transparent, better information would flow to the 
public.  Analysts are more effective intermediaries – i.e., they are better able to interpret 
accounting information – when the information environment is less opaque (Lang and 
Lundholm 1996).  
           As stock prices impound more firm-specific information in countries with lower 
opaqueness, information about future benefits will be better reflected in stock prices.  In 
those countries, stock prices are more likely to reflect the same information set as 
earnings do when earnings quality is high.  When countries have highly opaque 
information environments, stock prices do not reflect information about future benefits as 
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well, resulting in a lower returns-earnings association even if earnings quality is high. 
Thus, the association between the returns-earnings association and earnings quality would 
be less positive in countries with more opaque information environments.  We formulate 
the second hypothesis as follows: 
H2  The returns-earnings association is more positively associated with earnings 
quality for countries with lower information opaqueness. 
   
4 Research Design 
4.1  Data 
We select all firm-year observations from the Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial 
file over the period 1993 to 2003.  Then, we identify firms that have a time-series of data 
of at least seven years so we can calculate a firm-specific measure of earnings quality.  
We also use the stock price data from the Compustat Global Issue file.  After excluding 
observations for countries with less than 30 firms, Table 1 presents the numbers and 
frequencies of firms in our sample across 13 countries.  4,238 firms come from thirteen 
countries with at least 30 firms in our sample (number of firms in parentheses): Australia 
(105), Canada (224), Germany (64), Denmark (31), France (82), United Kingdom (463), 
Hong Kong (95), Japan (967), Malaysia (166), Netherlands (43), Singapore (102), 
Thailand (82), and United States (1,814).        
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
4.2 Variables       
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We measure the firm-specific returns-earnings association by estimating the following 
firm-specific regression and using the coefficient on the earnings change as a measure of 
the contemporaneous relation between stock returns and accounting earnings:  
RETj,t = β0,j + β1,j ∆EARNj,t +  εj,t                                                (1)   
where     
RETj,t = firm j’s 12-month return ending three months after the end of fiscal 
    year t; 
       ∆EARNj,t = change in firm j’s income before extraordinary items in year t, scaled 
          by market value at the end of year t-1. 
We label the coefficient for returns-earnings association β1,j as REA.  Similar to Tucker 
and Zarowin (2006), we use the fractional ranking of REA within each country in the 
analysis to control for country fixed effects.8  We use a long window in measuring the 
returns-earnings association because accounting information can be publicly released 
through earnings announcements, but can also be disseminated, interpreted, and processed 
through other information sources including analyst reports and media coverage.  Thus, 
the emphasis is on the association between stock returns and the change in accounting 
earnings over a long window rather than the response to unexpected earnings over a short 
window (i.e., the earnings response coefficient).   
Following Leuz et al. (2003), we use the anti-director rights score from La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (1998) as our first measure of investor rights’ protection 
(INVRA), and use the average score of three legal enforcement scores in La Porta et al. 
                                                 
8
 The fractional ranking for a firm is the raw rank of the firm divided by the total number of firms 
within a country to which the firm belongs. 
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(1998): (1) efficiency of the judicial system, (2) rule of law, and (3) corruption, as the 
second measure of investor rights’ protection (INVRL).  In terms of measuring 
information opaqueness, we use a Centre for International Financial Analysis and 
Research (CIFAR) based score on timeliness of financial disclosure from Bushman et al. 
(2004) as a first measure (INFOPT).  We use this CIFAR based score on timeliness of 
financial disclosure because Jin and Myers (2006) argue that information opaqueness 
could be related to the delay of bad news disclosure by companies.  We also use the 
number of analysts across countries from Chang et al. (2000) as a second measure of 
information opaqueness (INFOPA).  Lang and Lundholm (1996) show that analyst 
following is related to the information environment so we use analyst coverage in a 
country as a proxy for its information opaqueness. 
 Table 2 summarizes the scores of investor rights protection measures and 
information opaqueness measures across the 13 countries.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
To measure earnings quality, we run the first order auto-regression of earnings: 
            Ej,t = ρ0,j + ρ1,j Ej,t-1 +  υj,t                                               (2) 
where 
                Ej,t = firm j’s split-adjusted EPS,  income before extraordinary items in year  
                          t, divided by average number of outstanding shares between the  
                          beginning and end of year t. 
Based on Kormendi and Lipe (1987) and Francis et al. (2004), we use the coefficient ρ1,j 
in eq. (2), earnings persistence, as the first measure of earnings quality: QPER.  This 
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coefficient measures the ability of current earnings to reflect information about future 
earnings. We use the fractional ranking of QPER within each country in the analysis. 
           Prior research documents a relationship between earnings and future cash flows 
(e.g., Bowen et al. 1996; Barth et al. 2001).  We therefore also run the following 
regression: 
CFO j,t = δ0,j + δ1,j Ej,t-1 + ζj,t                                          (3) 
where 
CFOj,t = firm j’s cash flows from operations in year t, divided by average                                
number of outstanding shares between the beginning and end of year t. 
We use the coefficient δ1,j in eq. (3), the earnings-future cash flows relation, as the second 
measure of earnings quality: QCFO.  This coefficient measures the ability of earnings to 
reflect information about future cash flows from operations.  We also use the fractional 
ranking of QCFO within each country in the analysis.9 
 Finally, we use the five innate factors in Francis et al. (2004) as control variables.  
These variables are firm size, cash flow variability, sales variability, operating cycle, and 
incidence of negative earnings realizations.  Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the log of 
total assets ($m).  Cash flow variability (CFOV) is the standard deviation of the firm’s 
time-series cash flows from operations, scaled by total assets.  Sales variability (SALEV) 
is the standard deviation of the firm’s time-series sales revenues, scaled by total assets.  
Operating cycle (OPCYC) is calculated as the log of the sum of the firm’s days accounts 
                                                 
9
  We use at least 7 years of time-series data to run regression (1), (2) and (3) for each firm. 
Following Ball et al. (2000), the top and bottom percentiles of each variable in these equations are 
excluded.   
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receivable and days inventory.  Incidence of negative earnings realizations (NEGE) is the 
firm’s proportion of losses over the time-series period.  
  
4.3 Models 
We use the following cross-sectional model to test H1: 
        REAj = µ0 + µ1 INVRj + µ2 QE j + µ3 INVR j *QE j + µ4 SIZE j + µ5 CFOV j 
                        + µ6 SALEVj +  µ7 OPCYC j + µ8 NEGEj + µ9 INFOPj  + ωj                   (4)        
where 
            INVRj = measures of investor rights protection for a country to which firm j  
belongs, either anti-director rights (INVRA) or legal enforcement 
(INVRL);  
              QEj = measures of earnings quality of firm j in year t, either earnings  
                         persistence (QPER) or earnings-future cash flows relation (QCFO); 
       INFOPj = measures of information opaqueness for a country to which firm j belongs,  
                        either timeliness of financial disclosure (INFOPT) or analyst coverage  
                        (INFOPA) is used.   
Support for H1 exists if µ3 is positive and significantly different from zero.  The sign of µ1 
depends on not only the relationship between the returns-earnings association and 
investor rights protection but also the level of earnings quality.  Similarly, the sign of µ2 
depends on not only the relationship between the returns-earnings association and 
earnings quality but also the level of investor rights protection.  Thus, we do not predict 
signs for either of µ1 and µ2.  Based on Francis et al. (2004), the predicted signs of the 
coefficients on the five innate control variables are as follows:  µ4 <0, µ5 >0, µ6 >0, µ7 <0, 
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and µ8 <0.10  Further, we control for information opaqueness in testing H1, but we do not 
predict a sign for µ9.11 
            We test H2 by running the following cross-sectional model: 
     REAj = π0 +π1 INFOPj + π2 QE j + π3 INFOP j *QE j +π4 SIZE j + π5 CFOVj  
                       
+π6 SALEVj + π7 OPCYC j +π 8 NEGEj + π 9 INVRj +ψj .                        (5) 
If H2 is supported, π3 will be significantly different from zero and positive.  Similar to eq. 
(4), the predicted signs of other coefficients in eq. (5) are as follows: no predicted signs 
for π1 and π2, π4 <0, π5 >0, π6 >0, π7 <0, and π8 <0.  As in H1, we control for investor 
protection in testing H2, but we do not predict a sign for π9. 
 
5  Empirical Results 
The descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table 3.  By using the fractional 
ranking scores, the mean and median of the returns-earnings association (REA), earnings 
persistence (QPER), and the earnings-future cash flows relation (QCFO) are all 0.50.  
Table 4 presents Pearson correlations between independent variables.  After measuring 
earnings quality by the fractional ranking, both investor rights protection and information 
opaqueness are not correlated with earnings quality measures.  The correlation 
coefficients are 0.52, 0.59, 0.44, 0.44, 0.41, and 0.44 for each pair of country-level 
factors: anti-director rights and legal enforcement, anti-director rights and timeliness of 
financial disclosure, anti-director rights and analyst coverage, legal enforcement and 
timeliness of financial disclosure, legal enforcement and analyst coverage, and timeliness 
                                                 
10
  The control variables in the regressions are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. 
11
  We do not test H1 and H2 together because the interaction terms, i.e., INVR*QE and INFOP*QE, 
are highly correlated (r = 0.875 - 0.979). 
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of financial disclosure and analyst coverage, respectively, showing that the four country-
level variables are correlated. 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
          We conduct a preliminary within-country analysis for each of the 13 countries in 
the sample.  We run the following regression for each country: 
           REAj = λ0 + λ1 QE j +λ2 SIZE j +λ3 CFOV j+λ4 SALEVj + λ5 OPCYC j  
                        +λ6 NEGEj +θj .                                                                                    (6)                               
The coefficient λ1 measures the country-level association between the returns-earnings 
association and earnings quality.  We compute the composite score of investor protection 
and information opaqueness as the factor score based on the first factor from a factor 
analysis of anti-director rights, legal enforcement, timeliness of financial disclosure, and 
analyst coverage.  Table 5 provides the composite scores, standardized coefficients λ1, 
their corresponding t-statistics, and p-values for each country.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
           To see if the pattern in Table 5 corresponds with our hypotheses, we calculate the 
parametric and nonparametric correlations between our composite score and the 
standardised coefficients λ1 or their corresponding t-statistics.  We find that Pearson 
correlation coefficients for the correlation between the composite score and λ1QPER and 
λ1QCFO are 0.891 and 0.810, respectively, and these correlations are significant at the 1% 
level.  Further, the Pearson coefficients for the correlations between the composite score 
and t-statistics for λ1QPER and λ1QCFO are 0.692 and 0.676, respectively, and these are 
significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.  We find similar results using the 
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Spearman correlations.  These correlations show that our overall investor rights protection 
and information opaqueness scores are significantly positively correlated with the 
country-level metrics which capture the association between earnings quality and value 
relevance.  Thus, our within-country analyses support our hypotheses.   
           Next, we conduct cross-country tests by pooling data from all 13 countries.  Table 
6 presents evidence on testing whether the association between the returns-earnings 
association and earnings quality is related to a country’s investor rights protection where 
we control for INFOPT.  Untabulated results where we control for INFOPA are 
qualitatively the same.  Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 report the results on the effect of anti-
director rights (INVRA) on the relation between the returns-earnings association and 
earnings persistence (QPER).  The coefficient on the interaction term (INVRA*QPER) is 
0.052 and is statistically significantly different from zero (t-statistic = 2.98, p-value < 
0.01), consistent with H1.  The results show that the returns-earnings association is more 
positively associated with earnings persistence as anti-director rights increase, which we 
interpret as higher investor protection.  Consistent with findings by Francis et al. (2004), 
we also find that two innate variables, firm size (SIZE) and incidence of negative earnings 
realization (NEGE) are negatively associated with the returns-earnings association. In 
addition, we find that cash flow variability (CFOV) and operating cycle (OPCYC) are 
negatively and positively associated with the returns-earnings association, respectively.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 present evidence on whether legal enforcement 
(INVRL) affects the relation between the returns-earnings association and earnings 
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persistence.  We find that the coefficient on the interaction term (INVRL*QPER) is 0.044 
and significantly different from zero (t-statistic = 2.22, p-value < 0.05), supporting H1.  
The results show that the returns-earnings association is more positively related to 
earnings persistence as legal enforcement increases across countries.   
           Columns 7 and 8 of Table 6 report the results on the effect of anti-director rights 
on the association between the returns-earnings association and the earnings-future cash 
flows relation (QCFO).  The coefficient on the interaction term (INVRA*QCFO) is 0.075 
and significantly different from zero (t-statistic = 4.20; p-value < 0.01), consistent with 
H1.  The results show that the returns-earnings association is more positively associated 
with the earnings-future cash flows relation when a country has higher anti-director 
rights.  Columns 9 and 10 of Table 6 document evidence on testing whether legal 
enforcement affects the association between the returns-earnings association and the 
earnings-future cash flows relation.  The coefficient on the interaction term 
(INVRL*QCFO) is 0.014 and is not significant (t-statistic = 0.63), inconsistent with H1.  
Overall, the results in Table 6 support H1 that the association between the returns-
earnings association and earnings quality increases as investor protection increases across 
countries.  That is, the value relevance of earnings depends on the quality of earnings, and 
the ability of prices to reflect that quality.  
           Table 7 provides evidence on examining whether the association between the 
returns-earnings association and earnings quality is associated with the information 
environment of a country where we control for INVRA.  Untabulated results where we 
control for INVRL are qualitatively the same.  The results on the effect of timeliness of 
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financial disclosure (INFOPT) on the relation between the returns-earnings association 
and earnings persistence are reported in Columns 3 and 4.  We find that the coefficient on 
the interaction term (INFOPT*QPER) is 0.008 and significantly different from zero (t-
statistic=5.20, p-value<0.01), consistent with H2.  The results show that the returns-
earnings association is more positively associated with earnings persistence when 
timeliness of financial disclosure is high.  Columns 5 and 6 of Table 7 present the 
evidence on whether analyst coverage (INFOPA) affects the relation between the returns-
earnings association and earnings persistence.  The coefficient on the interaction term 
(INFOPA*QPER) is 0.001 and is not significant (t-statistic = 0.26), inconsistent with H2.   
Insert Table 7 about here 
           Columns 7 and 8 of Table 7 present evidence on the effect of timeliness of 
financial disclosure on the association between the returns-earnings relation and the 
earnings-future cash flows relation.  The coefficient on the interaction term 
(INFOPT*QCFO) is 0.008 and significant (t-statistic = 5.10; p-value < 0.01), consistent 
with H2.  Columns 9 and 10 provide the results from testing whether analyst coverage 
affects the association between the returns-earnings and the earnings-future cash flows 
relation.  We find that the coefficient on the interaction term (INFOPA*QCFO) is 0.004 
and significant (t-statistic = 1.95; p-value < 0.05), consistent with H2.  Overall, the results 
in Table 7 are consistent with H2 that the association between the returns-earnings 
association and earnings quality is more positive for countries with information 
environments that have low opaqueness than for countries with information environments 
with high opaqueness.  The returns-earnings association depends on both earnings quality 
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and the information environment.  The same quality of earnings will reflect different 
value relevance if the information environment is different. 
 
6 Additional Analyses 
We conduct several additional analyses to examine the robustness of our results.  
First, earnings quality is not an exogenous variable, and our measures of earnings quality 
may be affected by the informativeness of earnings, i.e., the returns-earnings association.  
For example, when REA is high, managers have more incentive to pay attention to the 
quality of earnings.  To control for this endogenous relationship, we follow a procedure 
used by Frankel et al. (2006), and we model QE as a function of the exogenous control 
variables and QERANK which is the portfolio rank of firm j’s QE: 
QEj =  α0 + α1SIZEj + α2CFOVj + α3SALEVj + α4OPCYCj + α5NEGEj +  
 α6QERANKj + εj   (7) 
To create QERANK, we rank firms by QE and then divide them into three equal-sized 
portfolios.  Firms in the lowest (highest) portfolio are coded 0 (2).  Once we estimate eq. 
(7), we use the fitted value for QE in place of the actual value in eqs. (4) and (5).   
 The rationale for including QERANK is that endogeneity is likely to affect the 
variation in QE rather than the level of QE (e.g., Greene 2000).  Thus, as Hentschel and 
Kothari (2001) explain, a relatively crude measure of the endogenous variable can be 
used as an instrumental variable since it is likely to capture the level of that variable but 
not the endogenously determined variations around those levels. 
 Table 8 summarizes the results from re-estimating eqs.(4) and (5) using the fitted 
values of QE.  For brevity, we only report the coefficients for the interaction between the 
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fitted values and our measures of investor protection and information opaqueness.  There 
are eight interaction terms, and six are significant and correctly signed.  Only 
INVRLj*FQCFOj and INFOPAj*FQPERj are not significant, and the corresponding 
coefficients in Tables 6 and 7 (i.e., INVRLj*QCFOj and INFOPAj*QPERj) are also not 
significant.  Thus, after controlling for endogeneity in QE, the results in Table 8 are 
consistent with our earlier findings. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
           Second, we re-estimate eqs. (4) and (5) by converting one of INVRj, INFOPj, 
QCFOj, and QPERj into a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if its value is at or 
above the median and 0 otherwise.  We find a more positive relationship for the returns-
earnings association with earnings persistence for firms in countries with high anti-
director rights, legal enforcement, and timeliness of financial disclosure (non-tabulated t-
statistics = 2.43, 3.21, and 4.91, respectively) when the country-level dummy variables 
are used.  In turn, to measure earnings quality by the earnings-future cash flows relation, 
we find significant evidence for each country-level dummy variable (non-tabulated t-
statistics = 4.53, 4.29, 4.56, and 1.41, respectively).  When earnings persistence is 
converted into a dummy, we document significant evidence for anti-director rights, legal 
enforcement, and timeliness of financial disclosure (non-tabulated t-statistics = 3.13, 2.73, 
and 5.58, respectively).  Also, we find that anti-director rights, timeliness of financial 
disclosure, and analyst coverage affect the association between the returns-earnings 
relation and the dummy of the earnings-future cash flows relation (non-tabulated t-
statistics = 3.76, 3.89, and 2.28, respectively).  Overall, our earlier results still hold when 
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we measure investor protection, information opaqueness, or earnings quality using a 
dummy variable.    
           Third, we test the hypotheses at the firm level based on the composite score of 
investor protection and information opaqueness in Table 5.  Likewise, we find that the 
returns-earnings association is more positively associated with the earnings persistence 
and the earnings-future cash flows relation for firms in countries with high composite 
scores of investor protection and information opaqueness (non-tabulated t-statistics = 5.27 
and 4.61, respectively). 
           Fourth, we examine whether the results are driven by the dominance of the number 
of the US firms and Japanese firms in our sample.  After excluding the US firms from the 
sample, we find that the returns-earnings association is more positively associated with 
earnings persistence for firms in countries with high anti-director rights, legal 
enforcement, and timeliness of financial disclosure (non-tabulated t-statistics = 1.81, 1.37, 
4.69, respectively).  After excluding the US and Japanese firms together from the sample, 
we find that the returns-earnings association is more positively associated with earnings 
persistence for firms in countries with high anti-director rights and timeliness of financial 
disclosure (non-tabulated t-statistics = 1.95 and 3.79, respectively).  After excluding the 
US firms or the US and Japanese firms together from the sample, we also document that 
the returns-earnings association is more positively associated with the earnings-future 
cash flows relation for firms in countries with high anti-director rights and timeliness of 
financial disclosure.  In summary, we still find support for our hypotheses when US, or 
US and Japanese firms are omitted.   
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          Fifth, we examine whether the association between the returns-earnings 
association and earnings quality is more positive in the US than in non-US countries 
because it is usually recognized that the US has higher investor rights protection and 
lower opaqueness of the information environment than other countries.  We use a US 
dummy variable that takes a value of one for US companies and zero otherwise, and run 
regressions of the returns-earnings association on the interaction term of the US dummy 
variable and earnings quality after controlling for the innate factors.  We find that the 
coefficients on the interaction term of the US dummy variable and earnings persistence, 
and the earnings-future cash flows relationship, are significantly positive (non-tabulated t-
statistics = 2.51 and 3.61, respectively).  Our findings suggest that US stock prices 
impound accounting information more precisely than non-US stock prices. 
           Finally, we test if the results are robust to the requirements on the length of years 
for data availability.  We increase the minimum number of years from at least 7 years to 
at least 8 or at least 9 years.  While this gives us more time-series data to estimate eqs. 
(1)-(3), it also reduces our sample size.  We find similar results, that the returns-earnings 
association is more positively associated with earnings quality when a country has high 
investor rights protection or low information opaqueness when we use a minimum of 8 or 
9 years of data. 
 
7  Conclusion 
This study examines whether the association between the returns-earnings association and 
earnings quality is related to investor rights protection and the information environment in 
an international setting.  We find that the returns-earnings association is more positively 
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associated with earnings persistence and the earnings-future cash flows relation when a 
country has high investor rights protection, measured by anti-director rights and legal 
enforcement.  Also, we find that the returns-earnings association is more positively 
associated with earnings persistence and with the earnings-future cash flows relation 
when a country has low information opaqueness, measured by timeliness of financial 
disclosure and analyst coverage.  Our findings suggest that the extent of investor 
protection moderates the association between the returns-earnings relationship and 
earnings quality.  In other words, price reactions depend on earnings quality and the 
ability of investors to be able to trade on that information.  Effectively the quality of 
prices and the quality of earnings both affect the value relevance of earnings.  Thus, this 
study implies that the role of accounting in capital markets depends on the institutional 
infrastructure of the capital markets.  Even if the accounting system can generate high 
quality accounting information in a country with a weak institutional infrastructure, the 
information is still less important to capital market participants in that country.  This has 
important implications for policy makers who emphasize the importance of international 
accounting standards harmonization.  Without improvements in investor protection, any 
(arguable) gains from improved earnings quality will not be fully realized.  
           Similar to other studies, this study has its own limitations. First, doing firm-
specific analysis requires time-series data, and this can lead to a survivorship bias.  
Second, we use the timeliness of financial disclosure and analyst coverage as proxies for 
opaqueness of information environment.  However, there are no well-established 
paradigms that support these two measures as being the most appropriate.  The 
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appropriateness of using these one-dimensional measures depends on how well they can 
represent the comprehensive features of the information environment.  Future research 
might investigate alternative proxies for country-level information opaqueness.             
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Table 1    
Sample firms across countries   
    
This table presents frequency and percent of firms with at least 7 years of data available 
in Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial between 1993-2003 for 13 sample countries. 
Country Name Country Code Frequency Percent (%) 
AUSTRALIA AUS 105 2.48 
CANADA CAN 224 5.29 
GERMANY DEU 64 1.51 
DENMARK DNK 31 0.73 
FRANCE FRA 82 1.93 
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 463 10.92 
HONG KONG HKG 95 2.24 
JAPAN JPN 967 22.82 
MALAYSIA MYS 166 3.92 
NETHERLANDS NLD 43 1.01 
SINGAPORE SGP 102 2.41 
THAILAND THA 82 1.93 
UNITED STATES USA 1,814 42.80 
Total   4,238 100.00 
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Table 2     
Scores of investor rights protection and information opaqueness across countries 
 
     
This table presents country scores of investor rights protection, measured by: (1) anti-director rights 
(INVRA ) from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998); (2) legal enforcement (INVRL ) 
which is the average of three legal enforcement scores, i.e., (a) efficiency of judicial system, (b) rule of law, 
(c) corruption, from La Porta, Lopez- de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), and country scores of 
information opaqueness, measured by (1) timeliness of  financial disclosure (INFOPT), a CIFAR based 
score from Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004); (2) analyst coverage (INFOPA), from Chang, Khanna, 
and Palepu (2000). Higher scores indicate higher protection of investor rights and lower opaqueness of 
information environment. 
     
 Anti-director Legal Timeliness of Analyst 
Country  Rights  Enforcement Financial Disclosure Coverage 
     
AUSTRALIA 4 9.51 89.13 12.30 
CANADA 5 9.75 99.28 16.90 
GERMANY 1 9.05 68.12 32.40 
DENMARK 2 10.00 73.91 12.87 
FRANCE 3 8.68 78.26 23.20 
UNITED KINGDOM 5 9.22 86.96 20.10 
HONG KONG 5 8.91 69.57 25.00 
JAPAN 4 9.17 86.23 14.87 
MALAYSIA 4 7.72 65.22 19.90 
NETHERLANDS 2 10.00 78.26 29.53 
SINGAPORE 4 8.93 63.77 20.90 
THAILAND 2 4.89 89.13 9.77 
UNITED STATES 5 9.54 97.83 30.23 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics about the following variables: 
REA    =  fractional ranking of the returns-earnings association coefficient within a country where the 
returns-earnings association coefficient is estimated for each firm from the following model, 
                 RETj,t = β0,j + β1,j ∆EARNj,t +  εj,t                                                (1)   
SIZE      =  Firm size, measured by the log of total assets ($m). 
CFOV    =  Cash flow variability, measured by the standard deviation of the firm’s time-series cash 
                  flows from operations, scaled by total assets.  
SALEV  = Sales variability, measured by the standard deviation of the firm’s time-series sales  
                  revenues, scaled by total assets.  
OPCYC =  Operating cycle, measured by the log of the sum of the firm’s days account receivables 
                  and days inventory. 
NEGE   =  Incidence of negative earnings realization, measured by the firm’s proportion of losses  
                  over the time series period. 
QPER    =  Earnings quality, measured by the fractional ranking of earnings persistence within a country,  
                  and earnings persistence is estimated for each firm from the following model,  
                  Ej,t = ρ0,j + ρ1,j Ej,t-1 +  υj,t                                                            (2)       
QCFO   =  Earnings quality, measured by the factional ranking of the relation between earnings and 
                  future cash flows from operations within a country. The relation between earnings and future  
                  cash flows from operations is estimated for each firm from the following model, 
                  CFO j,t = δ0,j + δ1,j Ej,t-1 + ζj,t                                                       (3)  
 
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3 
       
REA 4,238 0.50 0.50 0.29 0.25 0.75 
SIZE 4,238 6.27 6.21 1.83 5.07 7.48 
CFOV 4,238 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.10 
SALEV 4,238 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.08 0.25 
OPCYC 4,238 4.74 4.80 0.73 4.32 5.19 
NEGE 4,238 0.23 0.14 0.27 0.00 0.38 
QPER 4,238 0.50 0.50 0.29 0.25 0.75 
QCFO 4,220 0.50 0.50 0.29 0.25 0.75 
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Table 4 
Pearson correlations 
 
This table presents Pearson correlation matrix among the independent variables (N=4,205) 
 
           
Variables CFOV SALEV OPCYC NEGE QPER QCFO INVRA INVRL INFOPT INFOPA 
           
SIZE -0.38*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.36*** 0.03** 0.06*** 0.03** 0.20*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 
CFOV  0.36*** 0.11*** 0.41*** -0.08***    -0.08*** 0.07*** -0.03**     0.01 0.17*** 
SALEV   -0.15*** 0.07*** 0.01 -0.01 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.25*** 
OPCYC    0.14*** -0.02 -0.07*** -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.22*** -0.14*** 
NEGE     -0.10*** -0.15*** 0.03** -0.02   -0.00 -0.05*** 
QPER      0.47*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
QCFO       -0.00 -0.00   -0.00 -0.00 
INVRA        0.52*** 0.59*** 0.44*** 
INVRL         0.44*** 0.41*** 
INFOPT          0.44*** 
                      
           
*** and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5%, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 5 
Country-level analysis 
 
This table presents the standardized coefficients of regressing the returns-earnings association on earnings 
quality for each country (eq. (6)), and their corresponding t-statistics and two-tailed p-values.  Composite 
score is factor1 score of the factor analysis of anti-director rights, legal enforcement, timeliness of financial 
disclosure, and analyst coverage. 
 
REAj = λ0 + λ1 QE j +λ2 SIZE j +λ3 CFOV j+λ4 SALEVj + λ5 OPCYC j +λ6 NEGEj +θj .        (6)                                
 
 
Country 
Composite 
Score   λ1QPER t-statistic p-value    λ1QCFO t-statistic p-value 
         
AUSTRALIA 0.99 0.200 2.00 0.049  0.058 0.58 0.563 
CANADA 1.50 0.304 4.76 0.000  0.132 2.01 0.046 
GERMANY -2.06 -0.161 -1.26 0.212  -0.194 -1.41 0.165 
DENMARK -0.40 0.105 0.52 0.605  -0.277 -1.56 0.132 
FRANCE -0.41 0.157 1.40 0.167  -0.099 -0.84 0.402 
UNITED KINGDOM 0.78 0.160 3.65 0.000  0.083 1.85 0.065 
HONG KONG -0.29 -0.094 -0.85 0.382  -0.037 -0.37 0.716 
JAPAN 0.73 0.173 5.66 0.000  -0.011 -0.36 0.718 
MALAYSIA -0.46 -0.030 -0.40 0.691  -0.105 -1.39 0.166 
NETHERLANDS -1.16 -0.096 -0.54 0.591  -0.258 -1.43 0.162 
SINGAPORE -0.64 0.044 0.46 0.645  -0.053 -0.55 0.582 
THAILAND 0.72 0.175 1.55 0.126  0.225 1.96 0.054 
UNITED STATES 0.68 0.224 10.01 0.000  0.126 5.46 0.000 
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Table 6  
Effects of investor rights protection on the association of earnings quality with the value relevance of earnings 
 
This table presents evidence on whether the association between the returns-earnings association and earnings quality is affected by investor rights 
protection.  Columns 3-4 report the results of regressing the returns-earnings association (REA) on earnings persistence (QPER) and the interaction term 
of earnings persistence and anti-director rights (INVRA) (Specification (4a)). Columns 5-6 report the results of regressing the returns-earnings 
association on earnings persistence and the interaction term of earnings persistence and legal enforcement (INVRL) (Specification (4b)).  Columns 7-8 
report the results of regressing the returns-earnings association on the earnings-future cash flows relation (QCFO) and the interaction term of the 
earnings-future cash flows relation and anti-director rights (Specification (4c)).  Columns 9-10 report the results of regressing the returns-earnings 
association on earnings-future cash flows relation and the interaction term of earnings-future cash flows relation and legal enforcement (Specification 
(4d)). 
 
REAj = µ0+ µ1 INVRj + µ2 QE j + µ3 INVR j *QE j + µ4 SIZE j + µ5 CFOV j + µ6 SALEVj +µ7 OPCYC j + µ8 NEGEj + µ9 INFOPTj +ωj                          (4) 
      
 
                                                                   Specification (4a)                           Specification (4b)                            Specification  (4c)                         Specification (4d)                                          
             
Variables 
Predicted 
sign Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
             
Constant  0.542 7.82***  0.442 3.80***  0.695 10.00***  0.587 4.99*** 
             
INVRA  0.029 2.61***     -0.035 -3.15***    
             
INVRL     0.024 2.02**     -0.005 -0.43 
             
QPER  -0.055 -0.69  -0.231 -1.25       
             
QCFO        -0.275 -3.42***  -0.072 -0.39 
             
INVRA*QPER + 0.052 2.98***          
             
INVRA*QCFO +       0.075 4.20***    
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Table 6 
(continued) 
 
INVRL*QPER +    0.044 2.22**       
             
INVRL*QCFO +          0.014 0.69 
             
SIZE - -0.010 -3.89***  -0.010 -3.92***  -0.011 -4.10***  -0.011 -4.08*** 
             
CFOV + -0.154 -2.07**  -0.156 -2.10**  -0.178 -2.33***  -0.185 -2.42*** 
             
SALEV + 0.024 0.87  0.025 0.88  0.030 1.06  0.031 1.07 
             
OPCYC - 0.010 1.57*  0.010 1.58*  0.012 2.01**  0.011 1.85** 
             
NEGE - -0.263 -14.62***  -0.264 -14.65***  -0.276 -15.05***  -0.276 -15.01*** 
             
INFOPT +/- 0.000 0.15  0.000 0.27  0.000 0.29  0.000 0.45 
             
N   4,238   4,238   4,220        4,220 
F-statistic   53.08***   52.60***   38.36***   36.29*** 
Adj. R2   9.96%   9.88%   7.38%   7.00% 
                          
             
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (one-tailed). 
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Table 7  
Effects of information opaqueness on the association of earnings quality with the value relevance of earnings 
 
This table presents evidence on whether the association between the returns-earnings association and earnings quality is affected by information opaqueness.  
Columns 3-4 report the results of regressing the returns-earnings association (REA) on earnings persistence (QPER) and the interaction term of earnings persistence 
and timeliness of financial disclosure (INFOPT) (Specification (5a)). Columns 5-6 report the results of regressing the returns-earnings association on earnings 
persistence and the interaction term of earnings persistence and analyst coverage (INFOPA) (Specification (5b)).  Columns 7-8 report the results of regressing the 
returns-earnings association on earnings-future cash flows relation (QCFO) and the interaction term of the earnings-future cash flows relation and timeliness of 
financial disclosure (Specification (5c)).  Columns 9-10 report the results of regressing the returns-earnings association on the earnings-future cash flows relation and 
the interaction term of the earnings-future cash flows relation and analyst coverage (Specification (5d)). 
 
REAj = π0 +π1 INFOPj + π2 QE j + π3 INFOP j *QE j +π4 SIZE j +π5 CFOV j+π6 SALEVj + π7 OPCYC j +π 8 NEGEj + +π 9 INVRAj +ψj                            (5) 
      
 
                                                                   Specification (5a)                            Specification (5b)                            Specification (5c)                           Specification (5d)                           
             
Variables 
Predicted 
sign Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
             
Constant  0.309 3.51***  0.662 12.86***  0.873 9.89***  0.588 11.23*** 
             
INFOPT  0.004 4.30***     -0.004 -3.97***    
             
INOPA     0.000 0.04     -0.002 -1.78** 
             
QPER  -0.508 -3.82***  0.166 3.32***       
             
QCFO        -0.624 -4.64***  -0.038 -0.74 
             
INFOPT*QPER + 0.008 5.20***          
             
INFOPT*QCFO +       0.008 5.10***    
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Table 7 
(continued) 
 
INFOPA*QPER +    0.001 0.26       
             
INFOPA*QCFO +          0.004 1.95** 
             
SIZE - -0.010 -3.77***  -0.010 -3.85***  -0.011 -4.09***  -0.011 -3.97*** 
             
CFOV + -0.149 -2.01**  -0.151 -2.00**  -0.182 -2.38***  -0.184 -2.38*** 
             
SALEV + 0.024 0.87  0.026 0.92  0.032 1.13  0.033 1.14 
             
OPCYC - 0.010 1.65**  0.009 1.53*  0.012 1.91**  0.011 1.84** 
             
NEGE - -0.261 -14.57***  -0.265 -14.71***  -0.273 -14.88***  -0.275 -14.91*** 
             
INVRA +/- 0.002 0.34  0.003 0.60  0.003 0.44  0.005 0.80 
             
N  
 
4,238   4,238   4,220      4,220 
F-statistic  
 
55.33***   52.01***   39.35***   36.71*** 
Adj. R2  
 
10.35%   9.78%   7.56%   7.08% 
                          
             
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (one-tailed). 
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Table 8  
Effects of investor rights protection and information opaqueness on the association of earnings 
quality with the value relevance of earnings using a two stage process 
 
This table presents evidence on whether the association between the returns-earnings association and 
earnings quality is affected by both investor protection (as in Table 5) and information opaqueness (as 
in Table 6).  The second column provides the estimate on the interactive term (which is defined in the 
first column).  The third column provides the adjusted R-square from the regression.  FQPER (FQCFO) 
is the fitted value from the first stage regression where QPER (QCFO) is the dependent variable.  The 
first regression is where QERANK is 0, 1 or 2 based on portfolio rank when sorted by QE: 
 
QEj = α0 + α1SIZEj + α2CFOVj + α3SALEVj + α4OPCYCj + α5NEGEj + α6QERANKj + εj           (7) 
 
Description of Interaction Terms Coefficient Adjusted R2 from second stage 
regression 
   
INVRAj*FQPERj 0.060*** 9.87% 
INVRLj*FQPERj 0.031* 9.70% 
INVRAj*FQCFOj 0.075*** 7.28% 
INVRLj*FQCFOj 0.007 6.94% 
INFOPTj*FQPERj 0.008*** 10.18% 
INFOPAj*FQPERj 0.000 9.65% 
INFOPTj*FQCFOj 0.007*** 7.39% 
INFOPAj*FQCFOj 0.003* 6.98% 
   
 
*** and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5%, respectively (one-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
